Europe’s phase out of coal

Europe is progressing with phasing out hard coal and lignite in power generation, but needs to move further faster, especially in Germany and Poland

Reducing coal use in power generation and replacing it with renewables (and in the short run with natural gas) remains one of the best ways of reducing emissions simply, cheaply and quickly at large scale.  Indeed, it is essential to meet the targets of the Paris Agreement that the world’s limited remaining cumulative emissions budget is not squandered on burning coal and lignite in power generation.

Europe is now making progress in phasing out coal.  The UK experience has already illustrated what can be done with incentives from carbon pricing to reduce coal generation.  Emissions from coal have reduced by more than 80% in the last few years, even though coal plant remains on the system[i].  However, many countries, including the UK, are now going further and committing to end coal use in power generation completely in the next few years.  The map below shows these commitments as they now stand.  Most countries in western Europe now have commitments in place. (Spain is an exception.  The government is expecting coal plant to be phased out by 2030, but currently does not mandate this.)

Map: Current coal phase-out commitments in Europe[ii]

Source: Adapted from material by Sandbag (see endnotes).

In some countries there is little or no coal generation anyway.  In other countries plants are old and coming to the end of their life on commercial grounds, or are unable to comply with limits on other pollutants.  In each case phase-out is expected to go smoothly.

However, the largest emitters are mainly in Germany and Poland and here progress is more limited.  Germany has now committed to coal phase-out.  But full phase-out might be as late as 2038.  Taking another 20 years or so to phase out such a major source of emissions is simply too long.  And Poland currently looks unlikely to make any commitment to complete phase out.

This means the Europe is still doing less than it could and should be doing to reduce emissions from coal and lignite.  As a result, EU emissions are too high, and the EU loses moral authority when urging other nations, especially in Asia and the USA, to reduce their emissions further, including by cutting coal use.

Several things are needed to improve this situation, including the following.

• Further strengthening the carbon price under the EUETS by reducing the cap. I looked at the problem of continuing surpluses of allowances in another recent post, and accelerated coal closure would make the surplus even greater.  Although the rise in the EUA price in the last 18 months or so is welcome, further strengthening of the EUETS is necessary to reduce the risk of future price falls, and preferably to keep prices on a rising track so they more effectively signal the need for decarbonisation.
• Continuing tightening of regulations on other pollutants, which can improve public health, while increasing polluters’ costs and therefore adding to commercial pressure to close plant.
• Strengthening existing phase out commitments, including be specifying an earlier completion date in Germany.
• Further enabling renewables, for example by continuing to improve grid integration, so that it is clear that continuing coal generation is unnecessary.

As I noted in my last post, making deep emissions cuts to avoid overshooting the world’s limited remaining carbon budget will require many difficulties to be overcome.  There is no excuse for failing to make the relatively cheap and easy reductions now.   Reducing hard coal and lignite use in power generation in Europe (and elsewhere) continues to require further attention.

Adam Whitmore – 18^th June 2019

[i] See https://onclimatechangepolicydotorg.wordpress.com/2018/01/17/emissions-reductions-due-to-carbon-pricing-can-be-big-quick-and-cheap/

With and updated chart at:

https://onclimatechangepolicydotorg.wordpress.com/carbon-pricing/price-floors-and-ceilings/

[ii] Map adapted from Sandbag:

https://sandbag.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Last-Gasp-2018-slim-version.pdf

and data in:

https://beyond-coal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Overview-of-national-coal-phase-out-announcements-Europe-Beyond-Coal-November-2018.pdf

and https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=39652

The EUETS has not been fully fixed

The reforms introduced to the EUETS for Phase 4 improve its functioning, but without further reform a chronic surplus looks likely and the risk of low prices remains.

The changes to the EUETS that were agreed in late 2017 make significant improvements to its design.  The temporary doubling of the intake rate for the MSR will reduce the surplus in the market more quickly.  And the provision to cancel allowances from the MSR when it exceeds a defined size will avoid the number of allowances in the MSR growing indefinitely.  The price of EUA’s has risen, although they remain below the levels needed to stimulate many efficient emissions reductions.  These changes have led some to conclude that the problems with the EUETS have been resolved.

However, major risks remain.  The cap for Phase 4 (which runs through the 2020s) was set on the basis of an overall reduction in emissions from 1990 levels of 40% by 2030[i].  In practice, emissions now look likely to reach around 50% below 1990 levels by 2030, and possibly to go lower than this if additional policies are put in place.  This looks likely to result in emissions remaining well below the cap throughout Phase 4.

This is illustrated in Chart 1 below, which shows three scenarios included in a recent report by climate NGO Sandbag[ii] (to which I contributed).  The correspond to overall reductions from 1990 levels of 50%-58% by 2030, rather than the 40% reduction on which the cap was set.

Many of the additional emissions reductions are from the sectors covered by the EUETS.  In particular increased renewables and decreased coal and lignite burn in power generation are the largest contributors to reduced emissions.  Consequently, in each scenario emissions remain well below the cap throughout the 2020s.

Even the European Commission’s own modelling suggests a 46% reduction in emissions from 1990 levels now looks likely.  This, while a somewhat smaller decrease than shown in these scenarios, would nevertheless likely result in emissions below the cap throughout the 2020s.

Chart 1: Projected EUETS emissions under three scenarios compared with the cap

Source: Sandbag

With emissions so persistently below the cap the surplus, after decreasing to 2020, begins to grow again, and continues growing to 2030 (see Chart 2).  It does so despite the operation of the MSR.

Chart 2: Projected cumulative surplus under three scenarios

Source: Sandbag

With such a large and persistent surplus there is a clear risk of prices weakening. This is especially the case later in the decade, where reductions in coal use in power generation seem likely to reduce the need for generators to buy emissions as a hedge to cover forward contracts, which may in turn further reduce demand for allowances.

The problem of the chronic surplus arises because the cap is both undemanding and rigid. There are at present no mechanisms for automatically resetting it, and no measures such as price containment which might limit how low prices could go.

The best way to deal with this problem is simply to reduce the cap in around the middle of Phase 4. This would be in line with the principles of the Paris Agreement, which envisages signatories to the Agreement adjusting their commitments over time to bring them more into line with the agreed temperature targets.

Chart 3 shows the effect of resetting the cap in 2026 to match actual emissions.  Under the Base Case the surplus begins to reduce rapidly as a result of the cap being reset.  Such an approach could readily be made consistent with other reforms, such as introducing a price floor in the EUETS.

Chart 3: Effect on the surplus of reducing the cap in 2026 (Base Case)

Source: Sandbag

While the 2017 reforms to the EUETS were a major step forward they are unlikely to prove sufficient.  Further measures will be needed to make sure the EUETS is robust as emissions continue to fall.

Adam Whitmore – 9^th April 2019

 

 

 

[i] With a 43% reduction from 2005 levels in the sectors covered by the EUETS.

[ii] https://sandbag.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Halfway-There-March-2019-Sandbag-3.pdf

 

Increasing the political acceptability of carbon taxes

Straightforward, practical measures can make carbon taxes more acceptable to voters.

Carbon pricing often faces political obstacles due to public opposition …

Carbon pricing has spread widely in recent years, with around 40 systems now in place[i].  However, most emissions are not yet priced, and, even where they are, most prices remain too low.

Both expanding coverage and increasing price levels face political obstacles.  Overcoming these is essential for carbon pricing to play the role that it should in reducing emissions.  Fortunately, evidence is now emerging on what can be done to reduce opposition from voters – overcoming opposition from powerful lobbies such as industry warrants separate approaches.

A study by researchers at the LSE’s Grantham Research Institute, based on reviewing 39 existing empirical analyses, describes people’s objections to carbon pricing and other kinds of environmental taxes, and suggests specific actions to overcome them.  (The study focusses on carbon taxes, and most evidence is from North West Europe and North America, so the conclusions may not extend fully to emissions trading systems or to other cultural contexts.)

The study identifies several reasons people oppose carbon taxes:

• The personal and wider economic costs of a tax are seen as too high.
• Carbon taxes are seen as regressive, having a disproportionately negative effect on low-income households.
• Carbon taxes are not believed to be an effective way to reduce emissions.
• Governments are seen as having a ‘hidden’ motive to increase fiscal revenue rather than curb emissions.

However the study noted that people’s aversion to carbon taxes decreases over time after they have been introduced, particularly if the effects of the tax are measured and communicated.

There are various design options for reducing public opposition …

The study then identifies a range of measures for addressing the objections

• Phasing in carbon taxes over time, introducing the tax at a low rate but having commitment devices to subsequently increase the rate to more efficient levels.
• Redistributing revenues to ameliorate the regressive effects of taxes.
• Earmarking revenues for emission reduction projects, which is popular with voters and improves the perceived effectiveness of carbon taxes.
• Ensuring revenue neutrality of carbon taxes.
• In all cases, policymakers need to gather and communicate the objectives and design of the carbon price to improve trust and credibility, before and after the introduction of a carbon tax. This includes communicating emissions reductions achieved and co-benefits of reductions in other pollutants[ii].

Drawbacks to these options seem limited …

The study notes that these recommendations may diverge from “first best” tax designs recommended in the economics literature.  However, while the study does not assess the implications of this, it is not clear to me that, even where they exist, these divergences are very significant.  They seem to me likely to be easily outweighed by the increased acceptability (a “sub-optimal” carbon tax that can be implemented is usually better than an “optimal” one that can’t).  And there are likely to be benefits often omitted in modelling of “first best” designs. This is especially the case as once a tax is in place it can be modified to over time as experience is gained and acceptance increases.

For example, phasing in a carbon tax is likely to produce economic benefits by reducing economic dislocation due to a price shock from sudden introduction at its full level, which may at least partly counterbalance the inefficiencies from prices being below optimal levels for an initial period.  Similarly, redistribution of revenue to poorer households may provide an economic stimulus benefits as poorer households are more likely to spend the revenue than richer households.  It may also increase social solidarity in ways which are conducive to economic welfare and growth.

Other emissions reductions, for example improving building insulation and deploying new technologies, may be funded at more nearly optimal levels where there are currently restrictions.  However, caution is needed here, and there may often be a stronger case for dispersing funds to citizens.

Revenue neutrality can take different forms.  One approach is to use revenues to reduce other taxes.  This is the approach adopted for the introduction of the carbon tax in British Columbia.  Economists tend to favour this type of approach because existing taxes are seen as distortionary.  However this approach often lacks transparency and credibility even if accompanying tax cuts are publicised – for example if other taxes are reduced they may be increased again in future.  This appears to be one reason why voters tend not to prefer this option.

And the current Canadian experiment with “tax and dividend” approaches appears promising …

A stronger guarantee is provided when revenue is explicitly returned to citizens.  This approach is usually referred to as “tax and dividend” (or “fee and dividend”, or “cap and dividend” in the case of any emissions trading system).  I’ve previously noted the advantages of this approach (see here).  It has been implemented for the Swiss carbon tax in the form of rebates on health insurance costs.  Four provinces in Canada are now working on implementing dividends in the form of direct financial payments to citizens.  This will make most citizens better off as the result of the tax, because they will also benefit from revenue raised from businesses.

There is an argument made in the environmental economics literature that a lump-sum dispersal to citizens is economically suboptimal, because it is better to use funds to reduce other taxes and so reduce distortions.   There is little if any empirical support for this argument as far as I am aware.  But in any case taking a view that citizens have more of a natural claim on property rights to the atmosphere than governments makes the limitation of the argument clear.  From this perspective, not providing citizens with any of the proceeds from pricing emissions is in effect a 100% tax on those proceeds imposed on everyone.  This is indeed non-distortionary – it applies the same tax to everyone irrespective of circumstances – but a fixed per-capita tax is not regarded by governments or their citizens as a good idea anywhere, for sound reasons.

A larger objection to returning all revenue directly to citizens, or using it to reduce current taxes, is that emissions run down natural capital for the benefit of current generations at the expense of future generations.  Intergenerational justice would, as I’ve previously argued (see here and here), be better served by some combination of preserving natural capital and investing revenue from carbon pricing in a “carbon wealth fund” analogous to a sovereign wealth fund.  However this would be unlikely to increase the political acceptability of carbon pricing compared with immediate dispersal of revenues to citizens.

Overall, the study makes a range of recommendation that are well justified on a range of grounds, and seem likely to help establish carbon pricing more widely and effectively.  It is to be hoped that governments everywhere take note of the findings.

Adam Whitmore – 5^th March 2019 

Thanks to Maria Carvalho for useful discussions about the background to the study covered by this post.

[i] See the World Bank’s State and Trends of Carbon Pricing report here.  The definition of carbon pricing adopted in that report is quite broad, but even excluding some of the systems included in the report there remain over 40.

[ii] Please see World Bank’s  Guide to Communicating Carbon Pricing here for more information on developing an effective communications strategy.

 

Fixing the starting price of allowances in an ETS

Fixed price allowances can be a useful way of establishing emissions trading gradually.

I have previously looked at the relative advantages of carbon taxes and emissions trading systems (ETSs), including in the videos on this site.

Among the drawbacks of emissions trading systems is that they tend to be more complex to administer than carbon taxes.  An emissions trading system requires surrender of allowances, which need to be issued, often by both auction and free allocation, and tracked as they are traded.  There is a range of administration needing for this, including maintaining a registry of allowances and ownership.  In contrast, a tax simply requires a payment to be made per tonne emitted.

The administrative cost of emissions trading is unlikely to be a significant proportion of the costs of a system for a large jurisdiction with high administrative capacity, for example the EU.  However it can be daunting for smaller jurisdictions with more limited administrative capacity.  Even a large jurisdiction may be concerned about the time needed to establish an emissions trading system.

There may also be concern about the economic the risks.  For example, there will always be uncertainty about price when the cap is first set.

These difficulties can be reduced by including an initial phase of fixed price allowances.  Under this approach emitters pay a fixed price per tonne.  However rather than simply paying a tax they are required to surrender allowances.  An unlimited number of allowances is available from the regulatory authorities at a fixed price.

This approach has the advantage that it puts in place much of the administrative infrastructure necessary for emissions trading.  Allowances are issued and a registry is established.  From there it is a more straightforward path to limiting the number of allowances to impose a cap, and allowing them to be traded.

It has the further advantage that it can introduce a carbon price, perhaps gradually through and escalating price, and the effect of this can be assessed when setting  a subsequent the cap.  The additional information can further reduce risks.

The Australian example

This approach of issuing fixed price allowances was implemented in Australia, starting in 2012.  An initial 3 year phase was originally planned with emitters required to surrender allowances.  An unlimited number of allowances was available each year at a fixed price.  This was AU$23/tonne in the first year, escalating at 2.5% plus the rate of inflation each year. This was intended to be followed by a transition to an emissions trading system with a cap and a price floor.

The chronology in practice was as follows.  Legislation to introduce carbon pricing was passed in 2011.  The fixed price came into effect ion 1^st July 2012, with unlimited allowances available at AU$23/tonne.  Full trading was originally scheduled to being in 2015.  In 2013 it was announced this would be brought forward a year to 2014.  However this did not happen, as the incoming Abbott government, which took office in September 2013, repealed the carbon pricing scheme with effect from July 2014.

In the Australian political context that prevailed at the time the similarity to a tax was seen as a drawback politically.  It allowed the opposition to label it a tax, which the previous government had committed not to introduce.  A very sensible approach was therefore abandoned.  However this was a feature peculiar to Australian politics at the time, and not a more general problem.

The EU and the Western Climate Initiative have both shown that it is possible to establish emissions trading systems directly, without the need to go through an initial fixed price phase (the WCI systems were delayed by a year from their originally intended start date, but have generally worked well since).  And some jurisdictions will choose a tax in any case.

Nevertheless, if there is a desire to put an ETS in place in a way which lowers the initial administrative burden and some of the risks of establishing an ETS, then transitioning to an ETS through issuing fixed price allowances can be a valuable approach.

Adam Whitmore – 13^th June 2018

A limited but important medium term future for CCS

CCS has not yet been implemented on a scale needed to make a substantial difference to climate change.  However it continues to look necessary for the longer term, with more projects necessary to get costs down.

A decade or so ago many people expected rapid development of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) as a major contributor to reducing global emissions.  I was one of them – at the time I was working on developing CCS projects.  However, the hoped-for growth has not yet happened on the scale needed to make a material difference to global emissions.

The chart below shows total quantities captured from large CCS projects, including 17 that are already operational and a further 5 under construction.  The quantity of emissions avoided are somewhat lower than the captured volumes shown here due to the CO₂ created by the process itself.[i]

Between 2005 and 2020 capture will have grown by only around 25 million tonnes p.a..  This is only 0.07% of annual global CO₂ emissions from energy and industry.  In contrast the increase in wind generation in 2017 alone reduced emissions by around 60 million tonnes[ii], so wind power reduce annual emission more from about 5 months’ growth than CCS will from 15 years’ growth – though it took wind power several decades to get to this scale.    

Chart 1: Growth of large CCS projects over time

Source: Analysis based on Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute database[iii]

The picture gets even less promising looking at the types of projects that have been built.  The chart below shows the proportion of projects, measured by capture volume, in various categories.  The largest component by some distance is natural gas processing – removing the CO₂ from natural gas before combustion – which accounts for over 60% of volumes.  This makes sense, as it is often a relatively low cost form of capture, and is often necessary to make  natural gas suitable for use.  However, it will clearly not be a major component of a low carbon energy system.  Much of the rest is chemicals production, including ethanol and fertiliser production.  These are helpful but inevitably small. There are just two moderate size power generation projects and two projects for hydrogen production, which is often considered important for decarbonising heat.

Furthermore, most of the projects separate out CO₂ at relatively high concentrations or pressures.  This tends to be easier and cheaper than separating more dilute, lower pressure streams of CO₂.  However it will not be typical of most applications if CCS is to become more widespread.

Chart 2:  Large CCS projects by type (including those under construction) 

Source: Analysis based on Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute database

This slow growth of CCS has been accompanied by at least one spectacular failure, the Kemper County power generation project, which was abandoned after expenditure of several billion dollars.  Neither the circumstances of the development or the technology used on that particular plant were typical.  For example, the Saskpower’s project at Boundary Dam and Petra Nova’s Texas project have both successfully installed post combustion capture at power plants, rather than the gasification technologies used at Kemper County.  Nevertheless, the Kemper project’s failure is likely to act as a further deterrent to wider deployment of CCS in power generation.

There have been several reasons for the slow deployment of CCS.  Costs per tonne abated have remained high for most projects compared with prevailing carbon prices.  These high unit costs have combined with the large scale of projects to make the total costs of projects correspondingly large, with a single project typically having a cost in the billions of dollars.  This has in turn made it difficult to secure from governments the amount of financial support necessary to get more early projects to happen. Meanwhile the costs of other low carbon technologies, notably renewables, have fallen, making CCS appear relatively less attractive, especially in the power sector.

The difficulties of establishing CCS have led many to propose carbon capture and utilisation (CCU) as a way forward.  The idea is that if captured CO₂ can be a useful product, this will give it a value and so improve project economics.  Already 80% by volume of CCS is CCU as it includes use of the CO₂ for Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), with project economics supported by increased oil production.

Various other uses for CO₂ have been suggested.  Construction materials are a leading candidate with a number of research projects and start-up ventures in this area.  These are potentially substantial markets.  However the markets for CO₂ in construction materials, while large in absolute terms, are small relative to global CO₂ emissions, and there will be tough competition from other low carbon materials. For example, one study identified a market potential for CCU of less than two billion tonnes p.a. (excluding synthetic fuels) even on a highly optimistic scenario[iv], or around 5% of total CO₂ emissions.  It is therefore difficult to be confident that CCU can make a substantial contribution to reducing global emissions, although it may play some role in getting more early carbon capture projects going, as it has done to date through EOR.

Despite their slow growth, CCS and CCU continue to look likely to have a necessary role in reducing some industrial emissions which are otherwise difficult to eliminate.  The development of CCS and CCU should be encouraged, including through higher carbon prices and dedicated support for early stage technological development.  As part of this it remains important that more projects CCS and CCU projects are built to achieve learning and cost reduction, and so support the beginnings of more rapid growth.  However in view of the lead times involved the scale of CCS looks likely to continue to be modest over the next couple of decades at least.

Adam Whitmore – 25^th April 2018

[i] CO₂ will generally be produced in making the energy necessary to run the capture process, compression of the CO₂ for transport, and the rest of the transport and storage process.  This CO₂ will be either emitted, which reduces the net gain from capture, or captured, in which case it is part of the total.  In either case the net savings compared with what would have been emitted to the atmosphere with no CCS are lower than the total captured.

[ii] Wind generation increased by a little over 100 TWh between 2016 and 2017 (Source: Enerdata).  Assuming this displaced fossil capacity with an average emissions intensity of 0.6 t/MWh (roughly half each coal and gas) total avoided emissions would be 60 million tonnes.

[iii] https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/projects/large-scale-ccs-projects

[iv] https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenrg.2015.00008/full

There should be few reservations about auction reserve prices

The auction reserve price in California has proved successful in maintaining a minimum carbon price.  However it shows the importance for an emissions trading system of political commitment and stability. 

This is the second of two posts looking at experience of carbon price floors.  My previous post looked at UK carbon price support, which guarantees a minimum price by means of a tax.   This post looks at an alternative approach, which is used in California  and the other Western Climate Imitative systems, Quebec and Ontario.  Here, instead of imposing a tax, the floor is set by specifying a reserve price in auctions of allowances.  If bids in auctions stay below the reserve price the allowances are not sold.  Reserve prices such as this are common in practice in many commercial auctions, including those held by major auction houses and online.

Reserve prices give what is often called a “soft” floor.  The market price can go below the auction reserve, but eventually the need to buy allowances at auction is likely to ensure that the price recovers.

The chart below shows the auction reserve price in the California system (green line), which started at $10/tonne in 2012 and is increased each year by 5% plus the rate of inflation.  The California market price (blue line) has generally stayed above this level.  However it did dip below the reserve price for a while in 2016, illustrating that the floor is soft.  This price dip reflected a combination of legal challenges to the system, and political uncertainty about the continuation of the system after 2020, which together reduced the demand for allowances.  Once those uncertainties were resolved the market price recovered.

Chart: Auction reserve prices and market allowance prices in the California cap-and-trade system to end of 2017

Source:  http://calcarbondash.org/ and CARB

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) has similar arrangements but with a much lower reserve price, and there too the price has been above the floor.

The environmental effectiveness of price containment mechanisms depends in large part on what eventually happens to any unsold allowances.  In the case of California this issue particularly affects the upper Price Containment Reserve, from which allowances are released if prices go above defined thresholds.  Allowances from this reserve appear most unlikely to be required in the current phase, as prices seem highly unlikely to reach the threshold levels.  If these unsold allowances in the reserve are cancelled, or otherwise put beyond use, cumulative emissions will be lower.  However if they eventually find their way back into the system, and enable the corresponding quantity of emissions to take place, the environmental benefit may not be realised, or at least not it full.  Some sort of cancellation mechanism is therefore needed, for example cancelling allowances that have been in the reserve for more than a specified number of years.

So price floors can work, however in the case of the California system at least two things need to be agreed as the rules for the system after 2020 are debated this year.

First, continuation of the escalation of the floor price needs be confirmed at least at the current rate, and ideally the rate should be increased.

Secondly, rules for cancelling unsold allowances from the Price Containment Reserve need to be defined.  The cancellation of allowances from the Market Stability Reserve included in the recent reforms to the EUETS sets a valuable precedent in this respect.

The theoretical advantages of a floor price in an ETS are well known.  The experience of auction reserve prices now proving effective in practice over a number of years should encourage other jurisdictions, especially the EU, to introduce similar arrangements.  And those jurisdictions such as California where they are already in place need to continue to develop and enhance them.

Adam Whitmore – 15^th February 2018

Emissions reductions from carbon pricing can be big, quick and cheap

The UK carbon tax on fuel for power generation provides the most clear-cut example anywhere in the world of large scale emissions reductions from carbon pricing.   These reductions have been achieved by a price that, while higher than in the EU ETS, remains moderate or low against a range of other markers, including other carbon taxes.

The carbon price for fuels used in power generation in the UK consists of two components.  The first is the price of allowances (EUAs) under the EUETS.  The second is the UK’s own carbon tax for the power sector, known as Carbon Price Support (CPS).  The Chart below shows how the level CPS (green bars on the chart) increased over the period 2013 to 2017[i].  These increases led to a total price – CPS plus the price of EUAs under the EUETS (grey bars on the chart) – increasing, despite the price of EUAs remaining weak.

This increase in the carbon price has been accompanied by about a 90% reduction in emissions from coal generation, which fell by over 100 million tonnes over the period (black line on chart).   Various factors contributed to this reduction in the use of coal in power generation, including the planned closure of some plant and the effect of regulation of other pollutants.  Nevertheless the increase in the carbon price since 2014 has played a crucial role in stimulating this reduction in emissions by making coal generation more expensive than gas[ii].  According to a report by analysts Aurora, the increase in carbon price support accounted for three quarters of the total reduction in generation from coal achieved by 2016[iii].

The net fall in emissions over the period (shown as the dashed blue line on chart) was smaller, at around 70 million tonnes p.a. [iv] This is because generation from coal was largely displaced by generation from gas. The attribution of three quarters of this 70 million tonnes to carbon price support implies a little over 50 million tonnes p.a. of net emission reductions due to carbon price support.   This is equivalent to a reduction of more than 10% of total UK greenhouse gas emissions.  The financial value of the reduced environmental damage from avoiding these emissions was approximately £1.6 billion in 2016 and £1.8 billion in 2017^[v].

Chart:  Carbon Prices and Emissions in the UK power sector

The UK tax has thus proved highly effective in reducing emissions, producing a substantial environmental benefit[vi].  As such it has provided a useful illustration both of the value of a floor price and more broadly of the effectiveness of carbon pricing.

This has been achieved by a price that, while set at a more adequate level than in the EU ETS, remains moderate or low against a range of other markers, including other carbon taxes.  CPS plus the EUA price was around €26/tCO₂ in 2017 (US$30/tCO₂).  The French the carbon tax rose from €22/tCO₂ to €31/tCO₂ over 2016-2017. In Canada for provinces electing to adopt a fixed price the carbon price needs to reach CAN$50/tCO₂ (€34/tCO₂) by 2022[vii].  These levels remain below US EPA 2015 estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon of around €40/tCO₂ [viii].

This type of low cost emissions reduction is exactly the sort of behaviour that a carbon price should be stimulating, but which is failing to happen as a result of the EU ETS because the EUA price is too low.  More such successes are needed if temperature rises are to be limited to those set out in the Paris Agreement.  This means more carbon pricing should follow the UK’s example of establishing an adequate floor price.  This should include an EU wide auction reserve for the EUETS.  The reserve price should be set at somewhere between €30 and €40/t, increasing over time.  This would likely lead to substantial further emissions reductions across the EU.

Adam Whitmore – 17^th January 2018

Notes:

[i] Emissions date for 2017 remains preliminary.  UK carbon price support reached at £18/tCO₂ (€20/tCO2) in the fiscal year 2015/6 and was retained at this level in 2016/7.  In 2013/4 and 2014/5 levels were £4.94 and £9.55 respectively.  This reflected defined escalation rates and lags in incorporating changes in EUA prices. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/293849/TIIN_6002_7047_carbon_price_floor_and_other_technical_amendments.pdf and www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn05927.pdf

[ii] http://www.theenergycollective.com/onclimatechangepolicy/2392892/when-carbon-pricing-works-2

[iii] https://www.edie.net/news/6/Higher-carbon-price-needed-to-phase-out-UK-coal-generation-by-2025/

[iv] Based on UK coal generation estimated weighted average emissions intensity of 880gCO2/kWh, and 350gCO₂/kWh for gas generation.

[v] 50 million tonnes p.a. at a social cost of carbon based on US EPA estimates of $47/tonne (€40/tonne).

[vi] There is a standard objection to a floor in one country under the EUETS is that it does not change of the overall cap at an EU level so, it is said, does not decrease emissions.  However this does not hold under the present conditions of the EUETS, and is unlikely to do so in any case.  A review of how emissions reductions from national measures, such as the UK carbon price floor, do in fact reduce total cumulative emissions over time is provided was provided in my recent post here.

[vii] The tax has now set at a fixed level of £18/tonne.  It was previously set around two years in advance, targeting a total price comprising the tax plus the EUA price.  There was no guarantee that it would set a true floor price, as EUA prices could and did change a good deal in the interim.  Indeed, in 2013 support was set at £4.94/tCO2, reflecting previous expectations of higher EUA prices, leading to prices well below the original target for the year of £16/tCO2 in 2009 prices (around £17.70 in 2013 prices). See https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28510?locale-attribute=en.  The price is also below the levels expected to be needed to meet international goals (see section 1.2), and below the social cost of carbon as estimated by the US EPA (see https://onclimatechangepolicydotorg.wordpress.com/carbon-pricing/8-the-social-cost-of-carbon/ and references therein).

[viii] Based on 2015 estimates.

The case for additional actions in sectors covered by the EUETS is now even stronger

Recently agreed reforms to the EUETS mean that excess allowances in the MSR will be cancelled.  This further strengthens the case for actions such as phase-out of coal plant, increasing energy efficiency and deploying more renewables.

About a year ago I looked at whether additional actions to reduce emissions in sectors covered by the EUETS do in practice lead to net emissions reductions over time [i].

It is sometimes claimed that total emissions are always equal to the fixed cap.  By implication additional actions do not reduce total emissions, because if emissions are reduced in one place there will be a corresponding increase elsewhere.  This is sometimes called the “waterbed hypothesis” by analogy – if you squeeze in one place there is an equal size bulge elsewhere.

Although often repeated, this claim is untrue.  Under the EU ETS at present the vast majority of emissions reductions from additional actions will be permanently retained, reflecting the continuing surplus of allowances and the operation of the MSR.  Furthermore, over the long term the cap is not fixed, but can respond to circumstances.  For example, tighter caps can be set by policy makers once emissions reductions have been demonstrated as feasible.

When I last looked at this issue, the fate of additional allowances in the MSR remained necessarily speculative.  It was clear that additional excess allowances would at least not return to the market for decades.  It also seemed likely that they would be cancelled.  However, no cancellation mechanism was then defined.

This has now changed with the trilogue conclusions reached last week, which include a limit on the size of the MSR from 2023.  The limit is equal to the previous year’s auction volume, and is likely, given the size of the current surplus, to lead to large numbers of allowances being cancelled in the 2020s.

With this limit in place there is a very clear pathway by which allowances freed up by additional actions, such as reduced coal burn or increased renewables, will add to the surplus, be transferred to the MSR then cancelled (see diagram).  Total emissions under the EUETS will be correspondingly lower.

There is now a clear mechanism by which additional actions reduce total emissions

Modelling confirms that with the limit on the size of the MSR in place a large majority of reductions from non-ETS actions are retained, because additional allowances freed up almost all go into the MSR, and are then cancelled.  This is shown in the chart below for an illustrative case of additional actions which reduce emissions by 100 million tonnes in 2020.  Not all of the allowances freed up by additional actions are cancelled.  First there is a small rebound in emissions due to price changes (see references for more on this effect).  Then, even over a decade, the MSR does not remove them all from circulation.  This is because it takes a percentage of the remainder each year, so the remainder successively decreases, but does not reach zero.  If the period were extended beyond 2030 a larger proportion would be cancelled, assuming a continuing surplus.  Nevertheless over 80% of allowances freed up by additional actions are cancelled by 2030.

The benefit of additional actions is thus strongly confirmed.

The large majority of allowances freed up by additional actions are eventually cancelled

Source: Sandbag

When the market eventually returns to scarcity the effect of additional actions becomes more complex.  However additional actions are still likely to reduce future emissions, for example by enabling lower caps in future.

Policy makers should pursue ambitious programmes of additional action in sectors covered by the EUETS, confident of their effectiveness in the light of these conclusions.  Some of the largest and lowest cost gains are likely to be from the phase out of coal and lignite for electricity generation, which still accounts for almost 40% of emissions under the EUETS.  Continuing efforts to deploy renewables and increase energy efficiency are also likely to be highly beneficial.

Adam Whitmore – 15^th November 2017

[i] See https://onclimatechangepolicydotorg.wordpress.com/2016/10/21/additional-actions-in-euets-sectors-can-reduce-cumulative-emissions/  For further detail see https://sandbag.org.uk/project/puncturing-the-waterbed-myth/ .  A study by the Danish Council on Climate Change reached similar conclusions, extending the analysis to the particular case of renewables policy.  See Subsidies to renewable energy and the european emissions trading system: is there really a waterbed effect? By Frederik Silbye, Danish Council on Climate Change Peter Birch Sørensen, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen and Danish Council on Climate Change, March 2017.

A chance to change some dubious climate accounting

The UK should change the way it accounts for emissions under its legally binding carbon budgets, whether or not it remains part of the EUETS.

An apparently technical question about the UK’s accounting for its carbon budgets raises broader questions about alignment of targets and policy instruments.

The UK’s carbon budgets are legally binding obligations under the Climate Change Act (2008) to limit total emissions from the UK.  Checking whether emissions are within the budget ought to be simple.  Measure the UK’s emissions to see if they are at or under budget.  If not there’s a problem.

But it does not work that way.  For sectors not covered by the EUETS actual emissions are indeed used.  However for those sectors covered by the EUETS – power generation and large industry – emissions are deemed always to be equal to the UK’s allocation under the EUETS (which is made up of both auctioned allowances allocated free of charge[1]), whatever emissions are in reality.  Actual emissions from the covered sectors could be much higher and carbon budgets would still be met

While this may sound bizarre, there was a logic to it when the rules were established.  If UK emissions from the traded sector are above the UK’s allocation UK emitters need to buy in EUAs.  If the scheme were short of allowances, as was expected when present accounting rules were set, the additional EUAs bought by UK emitters to cover emissions above the UK’s allocation would lead to reduced supply of EUAs for others.  There would in consequently be reduced emissions elsewhere matching the increased emissions in the UK.  The approach was therefore to some extent a reliable measure of net emissions.  It also aligned with the EUETS having clear National Allocation Plans (NAPs) for EUAs for each Member State, something that no longer exists.

Now this type of accounting no longer makes sense.  With a large surplus of allowances in the EUETS, if the covered sectors in the UK emit more than their budget they will simply buy surplus allowances.  These allowances would otherwise almost all eventually be placed in the Market Stability Reserve (MSR).  Under current proposals (and indeed most likely eventualities), these EUAs would eventually be cancelled.  Additional emissions in the UK are therefore not balanced by reductions elsewhere – they simply result in buying surplus EUAs which would never be used.  This type of situation is sometimes called “buying hot air”.

To avoid this occurring in future, accounting for carbon budgets needs to change to actual emissions.  This will necessarily happen anyway if the UK leaves the EU ETS.  UK allocations under the EUETS will no longer exist. Accounting cannot be based on a non-existent allocation.

But even if the UK stays part of the EU ETS the basis of accounting should change to prevent the UK is meeting its carbon budgets by simply buying in surplus EUAs.

The possibility of buying in surplus to cover UK emissions appears quite real.  UK emissions were above allocation until quite recently.  This was not too serious a problem then, because carbon budgets were being met fairly comfortably anyway.  However the situation may recur under the 2020s and early 2030s under fourth and fifth carbon budgets, which will be much more challenging to meet.  Total UK emissions could be allowed to rise above those carbon budgets simply as a result of an accounting treatment[2].

When a target applies to a jurisdiction that does not wholly align with the policy instrument there will always be a need to consider circumstances in assessing whether targets are being met.  The UK should not be able to meet its carbon budgets simply due to an accounting convention.  Current rules were put in place before the current oversupply under the EUETS arose.  It is no longer fit for purpose.  It should be changed to accounting based on actual emissions whether or not the UK is part of the EUETS.

Adam Whitmore -20^th June 2017

[1] This consists of auctioning plus free allowances plus UK allocation under the NER. In Phase 4 it would also include any allocation from the Innovation Fund. Future volumes placed in the MSR and thus excluded from auctioning would also be deducted from the total. If the UK were to leave the EU ETS and backloaded UK allowances currently destined for the MSR were to return to the market this would have a significant effect on measured performance against carbon budgets under current accounting.

[2] Whether this led to total actual emissions being above carbon budgets would depend on the performance of the non-traded sector.

A wealth of ideas about wealth funds

There are many ways of designing a wealth fund based on revenues from carbon pricing.  Debate about these is necessary, but should not distract from the merits of the broader proposal. 

Last month I outlined the value of the carbon emissions, and the possibility of establishing a wealth fund based on revenue from carbon pricing.  This post provides some brief responses to questions that have been raised in response to this proposal.   There are many good design options to choose from.

Would the fund necessarily be national?

No.  There are many national wealth funds in operation, and national carbon wealth fund may well be a pragmatic way forward in many cases.  However, the Alaskan wealth fund is an example of a state based scheme, and others would be possible.  In the EU a fund could also be established either at EU or Member State level.  An international fund would be difficult and perhaps impossible to establish, but would appropriately reflect global nature of the climate change problem.

How would such a fund be governed?

There are many options here.  The most important criterion is that governance should benefit the ultimate owners of the asset, namely citizens, rather than the state or special interest groups.  This implies some independence from government.  Other criteria such as transparency and ethically sound investment will also be important[1].  Some have advocated a fully independent trust fund.  However in practice some degree of government oversight is likely to be required[2].

How would this global public good be allocated internationally?

The distribution between nations of access to the atmosphere has proved a major point of contention in global negotiations on limiting climate change, and this situation appears unlikely to change[3].  However existing carbon pricing regimes – or simply emitting free of charge – already use up a global public good.  Giving citizens and governments a greater stake in increased carbon prices is likely to decrease the quantity of emissions, and so the proportion of the global commons used[4].  This makes the approach I have proposed more compatible with good stewardship of the global commons than existing arrangements, at least for the next 50 years until revenues start to decline.

What would the macro-economic effects be?

These effects would probably not be large, at least for a national UK fund.  The payment into a UK fund would be at most around £16 billion p.a. assuming much greater coverage and higher carbon prices than at present, a little under 1% of GDP per annum[5].  Even this would be unlikely to cause major economic dislocation, especially if phased in over a few years.  The fund would grow large over time, reaching around £860 billion by the end of the century, depending on many factors including which other environmental taxes were included  [6].  However this is not vastly larger than the Norwegian fund today, which is for a very much smaller economy.  Furthermore any fund would have the effect of redirecting revenue from consumption to investment, which would probably have a positive macroeconomic effect in the context of historic UK underinvestment.

Would such a measure be socially regressive?

The concern here is that poorer households spend a larger proportion of their income on energy than richer households, and so energy taxes, and thus carbon taxes, tend to hit them disproportionately harder.  However poor households still spend less on energy, and therefore carbon, in absolute terms than richer households, so an equal dividend, as I’ve proposed, would have a net progressive effect.   Furthermore, households account for only a minority of energy use, but would get the full benefit of dividends (or at least a large proportion), increasing the extent to which it is progressive.

However there are some important intergenerational issues to consider.   The proposal for a fund takes the view that present generations should safeguard capital assets so they retain value to future generations.  This is in line with the standard definition of sustainable development[7].  However there are distributional issues here which need to be addressed.  Some present citizens will be worse off.

How would it fit with other green taxes?

The proposal is clearly consistent with using green taxes more widely as a policy instrument.  What’s different from the standard approach to green taxes is the suggestion of placing revenue in capital fund rather than using revenue to fund current expenditure.  The landfill tax to which I referred in my original post currently raises around a billion pounds per annum[8].  It would be natural to add this revenue to a UK wealth fund.

Would distribution to citizens be the only use for funds?

There is no reason some of dividends from the fund should not be used to fund things like R&D.  As I have previously discussed there are many legitimate calls on revenue from carbon pricing.  However there are many compelling arguments for allocation direct to citizens, and this should in my view be a priority for the fund.

Each of these questions requires further elaboration of course, and there are many other questions to be resolved.  The design of any major new institution such as a carbon wealth fund will require a great deal of consideration of a range of issues.  However further examination appears to strengthen rather than weaken the case for such a fund.

Adam Whitmore – 22^nd  March 2017

Thanks to John Rhys for raising some of these issues.  A variant of this post, responding to John’s points, was published on his website. 

 

[1] See Cummine (2016) cited in my original post for further details For a specific proposal for a UK wealth fund:  http://www.smf.co.uk/press-release-conservative-mp-calls-for-uk-sovereign-wealth-fund-to-address-long-term-and-structurally-ingrained-weaknesses-of-the-economy/

[2] See Barnes, Who Owns the Sky (2001)

[3] This problem does not arise for the conventional resources (such as oil and gas) that typically provide the income for sovereign wealth funds of the nations where the resources are located. There is an interesting question as to whether countries should have full property rights to natural resources within their territories, as is often assumed at present, but this is too large a subject to go into here.

[4] The assumption here is that increasing prices from current low levels will increase revenue.  Carbon prices would increase by a factor of say five or more in many cases, and it is unlikely that emissions would decrease by an equal factor – though if they did it would be very good news.

[5] This assumes 400 million tonnes of emissions are priced, compared with 2015 totals of 404 million for CO₂ emissions and 496 total greenhouse gases (source: BEIS), implying a high proportion of emissions are assumed to be priced.  The carbon price is assumed to be £40/tonne, roughly the Social Cost of Carbon at current exchange rates and well above current price levels.  This would give total revenue of £16 billion in the first year based on both volumes and prices substantially greater than current levels, but still less than 1% of UK GDP of approximately £1870 billion in 2015. (source: https://www.statista.com/statistics/281744/gdp-of-the-united-kingdom-uk-since-2000/ )

[6] Assuming that the UK reduces its emissions in line with the Climate Change Act target of an 80% reduction from 1990 levels by 2050, and then to zero by the end of the century, and that 80% of emissions are priced at the Social Cost of Carbon as estimated by the US EPA, converted at current exchange rates of $1.25/£.

[7] Sustainable development is usually characterised as meeting the needs of present generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

[8] https://www.uktradeinfo.com/Statistics/Pages/TaxAndDutybulletins.aspx